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A Post-Mortem of the Hazell Era

With last Saturday's loss in the Bucket Game against IU, the Darrell Hazell era at Purdue is over (well, yes he was fired mid-season, but since interim coach was assistant Gerad Parker I would consider it a continuation). Hazell, much like predecessor Danny Hope, was fired for a lack of on-field success. Hazell was hired to re-energize a program lacking direction during the Hope era, and potentially return to the success of Joe Tiller's early years. While it is obvious that Hazell failed in those goals, what is the magnitude of that failure? I'm going to look at two factors: recruiting (using recruiting ratings from Rivals) and on-field success (using Football Outsider's S&P+, which is an opponent adjusted metric calculated for offense, defense, and special teams reflecting efficiency, explosiveness, field position, and finishing drives).
Figure 1

Figure 2

Typically, a team's talent is the driving factor for their performance. In college football, that is driven by a coach's ability to recruit. In that, Hazell massively struggled. Note: for this article I'm considering the coach on signing day as the coach who is credited for the class. His average recruiting class was ranked 67.4th in the nation, and 12.4th in the Big Ten. He had a class last in the Big Ten in 2015, and his best class was in 2013, where many players were recruited by Hope and his staff, ranking 10th in the Big Ten and 56th nationally. As seen in figures 1 and 2, he was consistently struggling recruiting.

Hope, while he managed to have two last place classes in the Big Ten (2009 and 2011), and had a class that ranked below 100 nationally in 2011 (Rivals does not rank classes below 100), had a much better average than Hazell, with 8.5th in the Big Ten and 57.3th nationally. These were the result of a middle of the pack class in 2010 (7th in the Big Ten and 57th nationally) and a pretty good class in 2012 (4th in the Big Ten and 34th nationally). Hazell actually entered with middle of the road talent as a result of Hope.

But both coaches failed to live up to the expectations set by Tiller. From 2003 (when Rivals begins having data) to 2008, Tiller averaged a 7.3th ranked class in the Big Ten, and 48.8th nationally. And as seen in figures 1 and 2, his success declined over that period; from a 3rd in the Big Ten and 32nd nationally class in 2003 to the last ranked class in the Big Ten Hope inherited in 2011. Given the success of his recruits before 2003 in both college and the NFL (notably future Hall of Fame and arguably the GOAT quarterback Drew Brees), that decline is even larger, and the expectation for his replacement even higher.

Recruiting is only part of the equation of success for college coaches, which also includes scheme and the development of that talent. The fruits of those labors can be seen on the field. To measure the success on the field, I am using the S&P+ Rankings developed by Football Outsiders. Their rankings are available through 2005.

Figure 3


Tiller set the bar high with a 2000 Big Ten championship and reaching bowl games in 10 of his 12 seasons with Purdue. Even in his 2005-2008 seasons of comparably less success than early in his tenure, he still had more success than either Hope or Hazell would manage. His best season during that period yielded no bowl game but S&P+ ranking of 18th, 58th, and 32nd in offensive, defense, and overall. Hope's best season in S&P+ was his first in 2009, when despite 33rd, 48th, and 42nd ranked finishes in offensive, defensive, and overall S&P+, the Boilermakers missed a bowl game. After a 2010 year marked with injuries, Hope's 2011 and 2012 squads made bowl games, but only managed to be 78th and 68th in overall S&P+. Hope's firing in 2012 in particular was a result of high preseason expectations and struggles against ranked teams.

Hazell, despite talent that was at the very least average in the Big Ten, struggled mighty, with overall ratings of 87th, 79th, 86th, and 114th in the 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 seasons. Yes, this year was worse than the 2013 campaign in which a late interception was needed to beat Indiana State. A large portion of that was turnovers by the offense, but defense struggled as well. Hazell's best year in 2014 had offensive and defensive S&P+ rankings of 92nd and 53rd, respectively, and yielded only 3 wins.

The Hazell era was, in short, a failure. Hope was fired and Hazell was hired to bring an improvement, and Hazell failed to deliver. Recruiting quality declined, quality of play decline, and attendance and fan support dwindled. The athletic department has an opportunity this year to turn things around with a new coaching hiring. This is an opportunity that can't be squandered.

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